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Abstract The paper presents a new philosophical theory of blurred vision
according to which visual experiences have two types of content: exteroceptive
content, characterizing external entities, and interoceptive content, characterizing
the state of the visual system. In particular, it is claimed that blurriness-related
phenomenology interoceptively presents acuity of vision in relation to eye focus.
The proposed theory is consistent with the representationalist thesis that phenom-
enal character supervenes on representational content and with the strong trans-
parency thesis formulated in terms of mind-independentness. Furthermore, the
interoceptive approach is free from controversial assumptions adopted by other
philosophical theories of blurred experiences and is able to account for the epis-
temic and motivational role of visual blur, i.e. that blurred experiences provide a
prima facie justification for beliefs regarding our vision and motivate actions
directed toward our eyes.
Keywords Blur  Vision  Interoception  Exteroception  Representationalism 
Transparency
The phenomenon of blurred vision has been interesting for philosophers of
perception for two major reasons. First, blurred visual experiences are problematic
for the representationalist thesis that perceptual phenomenal character supervenes
on representational content (see Nanay 2018; Schroer 2002; Tye 2003). For
instance, when one takes off glasses, vision may become blurred. This is clearly a
change in visual phenomenal character, but it is far less obvious whether this change
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is associated with any modification regarding which objects and properties are
visually represented. It may seem that after taking off glasses the same entities are
represented, but are experienced in a phenomenally distinct, blurry way. Second,
blurred vision is invoked as a counter-example against the transparency thesis, i.e. a
position that in perceptual experiences we are aware only of mind-independent
objects and properties (see Boghossian and Velleman 1989; Pace 2007; Smith
2008). It is so because in a blurred experience, blurriness does not seem to be a
property attributed to perceived, external objects. In fact, many philosophical
theories of blurred vision weaken or abandon the transparency thesis by postulating
that blurriness is a property of some mental entities (e.g., Crane 2006; Pace 2007) or
discard the intuition that in blurred experiences blurriness is not attributed to
external objects (e.g., Allen 2013; Gow 2019).
This paper presents a novel theory of blurred vision which is consistent with both
representationalism and transparency. To account for blurred vision, I propose,
relying on important similarities between blurred experiences and interoceptive
states such as bodily sensations, that visual experiences have two types of content:
(a) exteroceptive content, which characterizes external entities; and (b) interoceptive
content, which characterizes a state of the visual system. When vision becomes
blurred, as in case of taking off one’s glasses, some exteroceptive content is lost and
visual system is interoceptively presented as having lower acuity. More specifically,
I argue that there is a variety of blurred experiences which present different
distributions of acuity in relation to eye focus.
Such a theory is consistent with the representationalist thesis, as when vision
becomes blurry, there is associated modification in interoceptive visual content. It
also preserves the transparency thesis, as while blurriness is not attributed to
external objects, it is also not attributed to mental entities, but to the visual system,
which is a material being, no less mind-independent than dogs, chairs, and tables.
Furthermore, the proposed theory accommodates the fact, often neglected in
philosophical conceptions of blurred vision, that blurred experiences provide a
prima facie justification for beliefs regarding our vision and motivates actions
concerning our eyes (like rubbing, blinking, or squinting).
In Sect. 1, I explicate the key notions used in the paper such as ‘blurriness’ and
‘fuzziness,’ the distinction between ‘global blur’ and ‘depth blur,’ and alternative
formulations of the transparency thesis. Subsequently, in Sect. 2, I review the
contemporary philosophical theories of blurred vision in order to point out their
controversial assumptions. Finally, Sect. 3 is devoted to presenting the interoceptive
theory of blurred vision.
1 Blurriness, transparency, and representationalism
In philosophical works, the phenomenology of blurred experiences is usually
distinguished both from that of clear experiences and from phenomenology
associated with perceiving entities as being fuzzy (see Crane 2006; Smith 2008; Tye
2003). For instance, the example of taking off glasses demonstrates the distinction
between clear and blurred experiences. Without glasses, the phenomenal character
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of an experience seems to be different, but it is less obvious whether there is also
any change in representational content (and so problem for the representationalist
thesis arises) and blurriness does not seem to be a property of perceived entities
(which generates a problem for the transparency thesis). However, even a clear
experience can present some entities as being fuzzy, i.e. as having indistinct edges.
For example, this frequently happens when perceiving clouds, shadows, or
watercolor paintings. The phenomenology associated with clearly perceiving fuzzy
objects seems to be distinct from that associated with perceiving sharp edges
blurrily and, as in the eyeglass example, it is not obvious whether this phenomenal
distinction corresponds with a difference in representational content. Furthermore,
when a fuzzy edge is perceived clearly, fuzziness seems to be a property which is
visually attributed to an external entity. In contrast, when a sharp edge is perceived
blurrily, it is less plausible to postulate that blurriness is externally attributed as a
property of the edge. Experiencing objects in a blurry way is also distinguished from
experiencing objects by using peripheral vision. In both cases, the surroundings are
presented in a less detailed manner than is the case for more usual clear experiences,
but philosophers generally agree that the phenomenology of peripheral vision is
distinct from that of blurred experiences (see Allen 2013; Nanay 2018). In
consequence, visual blur is considered as a phenomenon concerning central vision.
A further distinction can be made within the category of blurred experiences
itself. First, a blurred experience may result from a general drop in acuity such that
all things within visual field become blurry no matter the eyes’ current focus. This is
usually a sign of disorder caused by, inter alia, fatigue, dry eyes, myopia,
intoxication, or physiological disturbances within the visual cortex. Because this
form of blurriness encompasses whole visual field, I will refer to such blurred
experiences as involving ‘global blur.’ Second, blurred experiences commonly
occur due to variations in how eyes are focused. When one focuses on a proximal
object, then distant objects are experienced blurrily; conversely, focusing sight on
distant objects makes nearby items appear blurry. Different than in case of global
blur, this type of visual blur does not encompass the whole visual field, as while
some objects look blurry, others are perceived clearly. Blurred experiences of this
type are not associated with any disorder and blurriness resulting from variations in
eye focus serve as a cue for mechanisms responsible for depth perception, leading
me to name this form of blur ‘depth blur.’ In fact, the majority of visual experiences
which we intuitively consider ‘clear’ involve some phenomenal combination of
clearness and depth blur, as not all objects are perceived with the same acuity due to
way in which eyes are focused.
As I have already stated, the phenomenon of blurred vision is usually discussed
in the context of representationalism and transparency. There seems to be wide-
spread agreement that the relevant representationalist thesis is that phenomenal
character supervenes on representational content, or, in other words, that every
change in phenomenal character is associated with a change in content (see Bourget
2015; Nanay 2018; Schroer 2002; Tye 2003). However, such general agreement is
not present in case of the transparency thesis. The basic intuition concerning
transparency is that we are aware only of mind-independent objects and their
properties in our visual experiences. In other words, according to the transparency
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thesis, we do not need to postulate the awareness of any mental elements such as
qualia or properties of the experience itself to account for the phenomenology of
experiences. Transparency is often accepted together with representationalism
because a thesis that we are aware only of mind-independent objects and their
properties may seem to be in favor of a thesis that phenomenal character supervenes
on content. However, the connection between transparency and representationalism
is not necessary, as it is possible to postulate that phenomenal character supervenes
on content while specifying content in such a way that it characterizes also some
nonstandard, mental entities (see Pace 2007 for such a theory).
The transparency thesis is sometimes given a weaker, phenomenal reading
according to which it seems to us that we are only aware of presented objects and
properties. However, a stronger, metaphysical understating is also adopted, which
states that we are in fact only visually aware of presented objects and properties (see
Gow 2019 for this distinction). Furthermore, in order to distinguish them from
entities such as qualia, presented objects and properties which transparency holds
we are aware of are sometimes characterized as ‘mind-independent entities’ (e.g.,
Allen 2013; Crane and French 2015, 2015; Martin 2002) or alternatively as
‘external entities’ (e.g., Tye 2002).
Mind-independentness is postulated to exclude mental entities and their
properties. However, externality may be understood in a stronger way as excluding
not only mental entities but also our body and its parts. My interoceptive theory of
blurred experiences is consistent with both weaker phenomenal and stronger
metaphysical readings of the transparency thesis. Nevertheless, because I interpret
visual blur as presenting state of visual system, my account does not satisfy these
formulations of the transparency thesis which characterize transparency in terms of
externality, but only those which use the notion of mind-independence. While the
visual system is a non-mental, physical entity which possesses physical properties, it
is obviously an internal fragment of the perceiver’s body.1 However, even if one
treats the formulation of the transparency thesis made in terms of externality as the
correct one, the fact that may account explains the phenomenon of blur without
reference to mind-dependent entities may still be considers as its advantage.
2 Theories of blurred vision
In this section, I discuss the contemporary philosophical theories of blurred vision. I
do not aim to provide arguments which would force anybody to abandon these
theories, but I show that all available accounts of blurred experiences have some
important drawbacks. This serves as a basis for showing that the described problems
do not threaten my interoceptive theory. First, I present accounts which preserve
both the representationalist thesis and the transparency thesis at the cost of
1 One may claim that visual system is also a mental entity, as it is one of the constituents of the mind.
However, it is not the sense of ‘mental’ that is relevant here. The visual system is non-mental and mind-
independent because, unlike qualia, is a physical, spatiotemporal entity that is not produced by mental
activities, but itself plays a role in generating mental states.
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sacrificing the intuition that blur is not visually attributed to external objects.
Second, accounts which accommodate this intuition but reject or weaken the
transparency thesis are discussed. Finally, I describe negative theories of blurred
vision that analyze blurred experiences in terms of loss of content. I believe that
negative theories present correct but incomplete account of visual blur which should
be supplemented by introducing interoceptive visual content.
2.1 Blur as a property of external objects
A common theoretical move is to explain blurred vision in a way that is consistent
both with the representationalist thesis and the transparency thesis at the cost of
rejecting intuition that visual blur is not a property attributed to external objects. For
instance, Nanay (2018) provides such an account of blurred experiences by referring
to the distinction between determined properties, like a particular shade of red with
specified saturation and brightness, and determinable properties like the color red in
general. According to his proposition, in blurred experiences objects are perceived
as not having fully determined properties concerning the location of their edges.2
This differentiates blurred vision from clear vision, including clear vision of fuzzy
items, in which determined properties are attributed to objects. In consequence,
transparency is saved, as in blurred experiences we are aware of determinable
properties of mind-independent objects, and representationalism is preserved, as
phenomenal differences between blurred and clear vision correspond to the
distinction between presenting determinable and determined properties.
However, it less obvious whether Nanay’s proposal is able to distinguish blurred
vision from peripheral vision. Nanay is aware of this problem and claims that in
blurred vision only properties concerning the localization of edges are presented as
determinable but that in peripheral vision all properties, like colors or shapes, are
not fully determined. However, such a criterion does not seem to work properly in
case of heavily blurred experiences, where a variety of properties, like those
concerning shape or size, are experienced in indeterminate ways. Even if this
problem can be amended, I believe that abandoning the intuition that visual blur is
not attributed to external objects constitutes a significant cost. In particular, visual
blur does not seem to play the same epistemic role as usual visual properties.
Typically, visually presenting an object as being F serves as a prima facie
justification for a belief that the considered object is F. This means that having an
experience as of an object as being F justifies that the object has the considered
property, but this justification can be defeated by some additional evidence—for
instance, suggesting that our visual state is illusory (see Siegel and Silins 2015 for a
review). On the contrary, it is less plausible to accept that perceiving something
blurrily provides a justification that this thing in fact has blurry edges. Instead, it
leads to beliefs concerning the state of our vision. In particular, when vision
2 It should be noted that according to Nanay blurred vision involves an attribution of determinable
properties to external objects and not just a loss of some determinate content (see Nanay 2018, p. 4). This
differentiates Nanay’s approach from negative theories of visual blur (see Sect. 2.3).
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suddenly becomes globally blurred, a person is likely to believe that her vision is not
working properly.3
A proponent of a thesis that visual blur is attributed to external objects may try to
explain why there is a strong intuition that such external attribution does not occur.
One idea is to argue that blur is visually attributed to external objects, but the
contrary intuition arises due to peculiarities of the content of blurred vision. For
instance, Allen (2013) formulates the ‘over-determination’ theory, according to
which blurred experiences have internally inconsistent content as they present edges
of objects as being simultaneously located at many distinct places.4 Such an
inconsistent nature of visual blur may be a source of intuition that blur is not
visually attributed to external objects. However, this proposal is not without serious
controversies. From the phenomenal perspective, it is doubtful whether blurred
experiences present the environment in an internally inconsistent fashion. In
particular, blurred experiences are introspectively quite different from the experi-
ences usually invoked to demonstrate cases of self-contradictory visual content. For
instance, in the waterfall illusion it seems that something is both moving and not
moving, and in Escher’s drawings, an edge seems to be both in front and behind
some other edge. However, blurred vision intuitively seems to present entities not as
having incompatible properties but rather as being presented in a low-detail way.
Furthermore, even if blurred vision presents edges as simultaneously multiply
located, there is not necessarily anything internally inconsistent in such multiple
localization. In fact, the ability to be simultaneously multiply located is often
invoked in metaphysical works in order to distinguish universals, which can be
multiply located, from particulars, which cannot, and is treated as an internally
consistent property (e.g., Daly 1994; Heil 2003, pp. 132–136).
Another way of ‘explaining away’ the intuition that blur is not visually attributed
to external objects is through denying the claim that the perceptual phenomenology
of blurred experiences is distinct from the phenomenology of clear experiences
presenting fuzzy items. In particular, Gow (2019) has proposed that blurred
experiences, but not experiences of fuzzy things, are accompanied by non-
perceptual ‘intellectual seemings’ due to which it seems to a subject that blur is not a
property of external entities. The occurrence of such seemings may be a source of
intuition that blur is not visually attributed to items in the environment. However,
according to Gow, the strictly perceptual phenomenology of blurred experiences is
3 It should be noted that the thesis that visual blur justifies beliefs about one’s vision is consistent with a
claim that such justification is primarily provided by experiencing objects in a blurry way (mainly
because visual blur is less apparent in case of empty visual space). For instance, it may be the case that I
have a hallucinatory experience as of a blurry object. In such a case, learning that I do not experience an
object also means learning that I do not experience an object in a blurry way (as there is simply no object
to be experienced in any way). In consequence, realizing that an experience is a hallucination may
counter a prima facie justification regarding the state of one’s visual system provided by visual blur.
4 Another idea regarding the peculiarity of blurred experiences’ content has been proposed by Pautz
(2010), who maintains a non-predicational account of visual blur. According to this approach, blurred
experiences present that there is blur everywhere without attributing blurriness to any particular object or
place. However, such a position is still problematic as, contrary to the considered intuition, it assumes that
visual blur is experienced as a feature present in the external environment.
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the same as perceptual phenomenology of clear experiences of fuzzy items, and so
both of these experiences perceptually present external entities as having the same
properties.
To justify that perceptual ‘blurry phenomenology’ is the same as perceptual
‘fuzzy phenomenology,’ Gow presents a thought experiment in which some
participants look at a sharp picture through glasses which makes vision blurry while
others look at a fuzzy picture through clear glasses. She claims that by relying solely
on the phenomenology of perceptual experiences, participants would not be able to
determine whether they are looking at a sharp or a fuzzy picture. Nevertheless, such
an argument is inconclusive, as it does not follow from the fact that under certain
circumstances vision does not phenomenally distinguish between some properties
F and G that it generally cannot phenomenally distinguish F from G. For instance,
circular shapes and elliptical shapes are phenomenally distinct visual properties
despite the fact that when objects are perceived from a certain perspective an
experience of a circle can be phenomenally the same as an experience of an ellipse.
Furthermore, it is not obvious whether in the example above one cannot
introspectively distinguish seeing blurrily from seeing a fuzzy image by relying
on perceptual phenomenology. For instance, changing eye focus is likely to
introduce larger phenomenal changes in a case of seeing a fuzzy image than in a
case of wearing blur-inducing glasses, as such glasses introduce a global blur that is
independent from variations in eye focus. In consequence, it is likely that when
perceiving a fuzzy image one can manipulate the indistinctness of its edges by eye
movements to a greater degree than when vision is globally blurred.
A more general argument has been formulated by Schroer (2002), who claims
that we distinguish between blurrily presented edges and clearly perceived fuzzy
edges not because they phenomenally look differently but by comparing them with
the rest of the visual field. For example, if edges look blurry in the whole visual
field, it is a cue that one is in fact having a blurred experience. On the other hand, if
a blurry edge is surrounded by clear edges positioned at the same distance, it is more
likely that it is a clear experience of a fuzzy item. However, the fact that vision
engages in such comparative heuristics does not constitute a sufficient justification
for a thesis that ‘blurry phenomenology’ is the same as ‘fuzzy phenomenology.’ In
fact, it may be that the phenomenology of blurred vision is distinct from
phenomenology of vision presenting fuzzy objects exactly because the phenomenal
differences are partially determined by the results of comparative procedures
conducted by visual system. Of course, debates concerning phenomenal sameness
and difference are difficult to settle, and I believe that one may coherently continue
to maintain that visual blurriness is phenomenally the same as visual fuzziness. My
point is that it is a controversial assumption; in Sect. 3, I show that one can explain
the phenomenon of blurred vision in a way that is consistent both with the
representationalist and transparency theses without identifying ‘phenomenal
blurriness’ with ‘phenomenal fuzziness.’
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2.2 Abandoning transparency
The theories of blurred vision discussed above maintain representationalism and
transparency by rejecting the intuition that blur is not visually ascribed to external
objects or by making some controversial theoretical moves to ‘explain away’ this
intuition. There is also another class of theories which preserve intuition about the
lack of external attribution of blur but postulate that to properly account for blurred
vision we should abandon or severely weaken the transparency thesis. According to
such theories, visual blur is a property of a mental item such as a subjective visual
field or a visual experience itself (Bach 1997; Boghossian and Velleman 1989;
Crane 2006). Often, the rejection of the transparency thesis is accompanied by
rejection of the representationalist thesis, and visual blur is interpreted as a
nonrepresentational phenomenal property (see Smith 2008). However, it is also
possible to explain blurred vision in a way that weakens transparency but accepts
the representationalist thesis. The most developed variant of this approach has been
proposed by Pace (2007), who adopts a ‘layered’ notion of visual content.
According to this position, visual experiences have two types of content: primary
content, which characterizes external entities, and secondary content, which
characterizes visual field. Thus, the representationalist thesis is saved, as the
phenomenal transition from clear vision to blurred vision is associated with a
modification of secondary content. Furthermore, this result is achieved without
rejecting the intuition that blur is not visually attributed to external objects, because
visual blur is treated as a property of a special, mental object: the visual field.
However, by Pace’s own admission (Pace 2007, pp. 331–332), his solution only
allows maintenance of a very weak version of the transparency thesis, stating that it
sometimes seems to us that we are aware of properties of mental entities but in usual
situations the properties of mental entities are difficult to notice. According to usual
phenomenal formulation of the transparency thesis it is not only difficult, but it
never seems to us that we are aware of mental entities and their properties.
Similarly, according to the usual metaphysical formulation of the transparency
thesis, we are in fact never aware of mental entities and their properties, but in
Pace’s solution, we are always visually aware of some properties of mental visual
field, even if it is usually difficult to notice this fact.
Alternatively, blurred vision is characterized not in terms of properties of mental
entities but by referring to the notion of modes or ways of presentation (see Dretske
2003). This idea is often proposed in the context of considerations regarding
differences between perceptual modalities. For instance, while both visual and
tactile modality may present the same property, like roundness, and so share
content, each modality presents content in a phenomenally distinct way (see Martin
1993; Richardson 2010). Applying the same idea to the problem of blurred vision
allows a statement that transition between clear and blurred vision consists of
representing the same properties under a different mode of presentation. Such a
solution preserves the intuition that blur is not visually attributed to external objects,
but is costly, as it entails some modifications regarding both representationalism and
transparency. It is so because (a) there are some phenomenal changes, regarding
modes of presentation, which may happen without changes in content, and (b) we
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are visually aware not only of mind-independent objects and properties but also of
ways in which these entities are presented. Furthermore, explaining blurred vision in
terms of modes of presentation is controversial, as according to usual understating, a
mode of presentation constitutes a way in which the perceptual system gains access
to some aspects of the environment. For instance, both vision and touch have some
specific ways of accessing the property of roundness. However, blurred vision
seems to be a phenomenon which does not reflect a perceptual ability to obtain some
information, but also indicates an inability to access some data due to lowered
acuity. Later, I argue that my interoceptive account of blur is free from such
theoretical costs. In particular, is consistent both with the usual metaphysical and
phenomenal reading of transparency, according to which we are in fact only visually
aware of mind-independent objects and properties and it seems to us that we are
only aware of such objects and properties.
2.3 Blur as a loss of content
Finally, there are theories which characterize blurred vision in purely negative
terms, as a loss of visual content. This idea has been considered by Tye (2003) and
further developed by Bourget (2015), who proposed an ‘amplification argument.’
This argument relies on a plausible assumption that blurred vision is a gradable
phenomenon: one experience may be blurrier than another. Given that, we may
consider a series of experiences such that first is clear and subsequent experiences
are more and more blurred. It seems obvious that in the case of the last elements of
such a series the majority of visual content is lost in comparison to the first, clear
experience, as when blur is severe one is only aware of colorful, indistinct blobs. In
consequence, a loss of representational content starts to occur somewhere between
clear experience and severely blurred experience. However, it seems arbitrary to
judge that up to some point in the middle of the series, perhaps the fifth or tenth
element, no content is lost, but after that content starts to disappear. Instead, all
occurrences of visual blur are associated with some loss of content which becomes
more and more severe as the vision is more blurred.
I believe that Bourget’s argument is convincing, and that blurred vision indeed
involves loss of visual content. However, I do not think that a negative theory
provides a full account of blurred vision. First, the negative theory does not
distinguish between blurred vision and other phenomena which also plausibly
involve loss of visual content. For instance, when an object is at first perceived by
central vision and then by peripheral vision some content seems to be lost. However,
blurred vision and peripheral vision are usually treated as distinct phenomena.
Similarly, visual content may be gradually lost with changing environmental
conditions, in particular when the amount of light in the surrounding is gradually
falling. Second, the phenomenon of blurred vision has also certain positive aspects
that are not accounted for by the negative theory. For instance, an occurrence of
visual global blur seems to provide justification for a belief such as ‘‘something is
wrong with my vision’’ and motivates actions such as blinking or rubbing eyes. In
the next section, I rely on these positive aspects in developing an interoceptive
account of blurred vision.
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3 Interoceptive blur
The theories described in the previous section characterize blurred vision by
adapting some controversial assumptions. In particular, they severely weaken the
transparency thesis, reject the intuition that blur is not attributed to external objects,
characterize the content of blurred experiences as inconsistent, or claim that there is
no phenomenal difference between blurred experiences and experiences presenting
fuzzy items. Furthermore, virtually all of those theories do not recognize the
positive aspects of blurred vision, i.e. that visual blur provides justification for
beliefs about our visual system and motivates actions directed toward the eyes. In
particular, when vision becomes globally blurred, it inclines us to believe that our
vision is not working properly and we are likely to engage in activities, like
blinking, intended to restore visual acuity. I believe that no philosophical theory of
blurred vision can be complete without accounting for these peculiar features of
blurred experiences. Of course, it should be noted that reflection concerning the
positive aspects of visual blur is not completely absent in philosophical theories of
blurred vision. For instance, Schroer (2002) recognizes that perception of sharpness
of edges is importantly determined by the ‘‘resolving power of the visual system’’
and Smith (2008) claims that the source of intuition that blur is not attributed to
external objects is that we know that blur results from a malfunction of the visual
system. Furthermore, French (2015) observes, from the perspective of relational
theories of perception, that a difference between clear and blurred vision consist in
the fact that in case of blurred vision, a subject does not have access to some
environmental properties due to her internal state. Nevertheless, these observations
play only a peripheral role in major theories of blurred vision and do not lead
authors to recognize the interoceptive dimension of visual blur.
3.1 Blur and interoceptive experiences
In contrast, I propose that the positive aspects of visual blur can be accommodated
within a theory of blurred vision by utilizing the notion of ‘interoceptive
experiences,’ i.e. experiences that present states of our own bodies.5 This category
includes bodily sensations, like pain or tactile experiences, which are experienced as
localized within bodily boundaries (e.g., Smith 2011; de Vignemont and Massin
2013); proprioceptive sensations, which concern the position of bodily parts (e.g.,
Elder 2013; Hochstetter 2016); and bodily feelings, like fever or tiredness (e.g.,
Slaby 2008), which are not experienced as localized within bodily parts but rather
seem to concern the body as a whole.
While the category of interoceptive experiences is significantly diverse, such
experiences have some characteristic features which differentiate them from usual
exteroceptive experiences presenting external objects. First, their phenomenal
character is such that it provides a prima facie justification for beliefs concerning
5 For the purpose of this paper, I assume that interoceptive experiences can be understand as a type of
perceptual experience. See Avila 2016; Aydede 2017; Fridland 2011; Schwenkler 2013 for philosophical
discussions concerning this issue.
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our own body (see Bain 2003; Mattens 2016; O’Sullivan and Schroer 2012; de
Vignemont 2017 for different expressions of this intuition). Even in cases of some
severe interoceptive illusions or hallucinations, like when one feels pain in a
phantom limb or experiences a tactile sensation during the rubber hand illusion, the
sensation is experienced as concerning one’s body and provides initial justification
for a false belief concerning bodily states. However, the phenomenology of
exteroceptive experiences is silent regarding whether or not a presented object is
part of one’s body. For instance, a purely visual phenomenology of seeing one’s
own hand may be exactly the same as the phenomenology of seeing, appropriately
positioned, someone else’s hand. In consequence, while exteroceptive experiences
may sometimes provide justification for beliefs concerning our body, such
justification is not provided simply in virtue of the phenomenal character of
exteroceptive experiences.
Second, compared to exteroceptive experience, interoceptive experiences usually
have a stronger motivational force, i.e. they often incline one to engage in certain
actions. In particular, pain and thermal experiences often evoke some avoidance
behaviors (see Klein 2012; O’Sullivan and Schroer 2012). This point can also be
demonstrated for tactile experiences, which are commonly treated as having both
exteroceptive and interoceptive character (e.g., Mattens 2013; Ratcliffe 2008;
Richardson 2011). It is so because tactile experiences present some properties of
external entities, for instance, that something is round, and also inform one about the
state of the body, for example that there is pressure exerted on a fragment of the
skin. The exteroceptive aspects of tactile experiences are not particularly associated
with motivational force. For instance, tacitly experiencing something as round or
heavy does not strongly incline one to conduct any actions. However, tactile
experiences with salient interoceptive component—for instance, when something is
crawling on the skin’s surface—often motivate avoidance behaviors (see Mattens
2016). Similarly, visceral states such as hunger typically motivate actions directed
toward satisfying certain desires. In contrast, though, while exteroceptive experi-
ences provide information about actions that can be undertaken, for instance by
presenting shape of an object, they usually lack salient motivational force.
I believe that the features outlined above are also possessed by many blurred
visual experiences. First, as already observed, there is a strong intuition that the
phenomenology of visual blur does not suggest that blurriness is visually attributed
to external objects. In other words, blurred experiences do not provide justification
for a belief that the world itself is blurred. Instead, the phenomenology of blur is
such that it intuitively provides a prima facie justification for beliefs concerning the
state of our visual system. In particular, having globally blurred vision justifies a
belief that something is wrong with our vision and a presence of depth blur may
justify that our eyes are focused on a nearby, or a distant, object. Of course, the
specific content of a belief justified by visual blur depends in an important way on
context and background knowledge. For instance, a person with scientific
knowledge concerning perception may literally form a belief referring to her visual
system and to a specific disorder. However, in different circumstances, the justified
belief may refer to eyes, which are commonsensically the parts of our body
responsible for seeing, and to some unspecified disorder (e.g., ‘‘Something is wrong
Blur and interoceptive vision
123
with my eyes!’’) or simply to the ability to see without characterizing in virtue of
what this ability is realized (e.g., ‘‘I cannot see properly!’’). Nevertheless, despite
these differences, beliefs justified by visual blur seem to be about the functioning of
our perception and not about properties of external objects. In consequence, the
epistemic role of blurred experiences seems to be similar to those of typical
interoceptive experiences.
Second, occurrences of visual blur motivate certain actions directed toward the
visual system and not toward external objects. In particular, in cases of global blur,
these actions are aimed toward restoring clarity of vision. They may be quite
automatic, like blinking, squinting, or rubbing the eyes, but may also involve
complex conceptualization, as involved in putting on glasses or seeking medical
attention. Such a variety of responses occur also in case of other interoceptive
experiences. For instance, some acute painful experiences automatically evoke
bodily movement, like removing one’s hand from a painful stimulus, while chronic
pain often motivates a search for professional help.
It should be noted that the proposal above is consistent with the possibility of
mistaking a blurred experience with an exteroceptive experience, like that of a fuzzy
object. Even if the phenomenology of visual blur provides a justification for beliefs
about vision, such a mistake can happen in at least two ways. First, it may happen
due to a higher-order deficit. For instance, while one may have an experience with
the phenomenal character characteristic of blurred vision, due to a lack of
attentional resources one may not correctly recognize that it is an experience
involving visual blur. Second, mistaking a blurred experience as an experience as of
a fuzzy object may occur when, due to a lack of sufficient information, the situation
is ambiguous for the perceptual mechanisms. As postulated by Schroer (2002),
distinguishing between blur and fuzziness requires certain heuristics in which the
perceptual system compares edges positioned in different fragments of the visual
field. If such heuristics cannot be applied successfully, for instance, because the
ability to change the eyes’ focus and register subsequent modifications in acuity are
somehow limited, the resulting perceptual phenomenal character may itself be
ambiguous between that characteristic of blurred vision and of exteroceptive
fuzziness.
The similarities between visual blur and interoceptive experiences suggest that
blurred experiences have an interoceptive aspect which presents some state of the
visual system. In terms of representationalist theories of perception it may be stated
that such experiences possess some interoceptive content. Of course, blurred vision
is not purely interoceptive. In fact, as demonstrated by the amplification argument
(Bourget 2015), transition from clear to blurred vision involves a certain loss, but
not complete disappearance, of usual visual exteroceptive content. In consequence, I
propose that two types of content should be postulated to explain the phenomenon
of blurred vision. The first is the exteroceptive visual content which characterizes
perceived, external entities. When vision becomes blurred, some of this content is
lost. The second is the interoceptive visual content which characterizes a state of the
visual system. When vision becomes blurry, a phenomenal blurry quality appears
which is determined by such interoceptive content.
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Furthermore, because there is a phenomenal continuity between clear vision and
severely blurred vision, I propose a more general thesis that all visual experiences
have both interoceptive and exteroceptive content. Structurally, this proposal is
analogous to Pace’s (2007) layered view of visual content. However, Pace proposed
that visual states have exteroceptive content and content characterizing mental
entities such as the visual field. Instead, according to my theory, both types of
content characterize mind-independent entities: external objects and the visual
system. The proposed theory is consistent with the representationalist thesis, as it
allows for representationalist treatment of the distinction between blurred and clear
vision and the distinction between blurred vision and experiences of fuzzy objects.
First, the phenomenal transition between clear and blurred vision entails a change in
the interoceptive content of a visual experience and a loss of some exteroceptive
content. Second, the phenomenal difference between visual blurriness and visual
fuzziness also corresponds to a difference in representational content. While visual
blurriness presents a state of vision and is associated with a loss of exteroceptive
content, visual fuzziness is a property exteroceptively attributed to edges of external
things. The interoceptive theory is also consistent both with the metaphysical and
the phenomenal version of the transparency thesis formulated in terms of mind-
independentness. According to the metaphysical transparency thesis, we are in fact
visually aware only of mind-independent objects and properties. This is consistent
with the interoceptive theory, as it postulates that visual experiences have
exteroceptive content characterizing external entities and interoceptive content
characterizing the visual system. The phenomenal transparency thesis states that it
always seems to us that we are visually aware of mind-independent objects and
properties. The interoceptive theory postulates that this thesis is plausible due to the
positive aspects of blurred experiences: visual blur seems to be about the visual
system, as it leads to beliefs and actions concerning the visual apparatus.
3.2 Content of depth and global blur
Nevertheless, there are certain aspects of the theory described above which require
further explication. First, according to my theory, both clear and blurred experiences
have some interoceptive content. However, while there is a specific phenomenal
quality in case of blurred experiences which corresponds to the interoceptive
content, such a salient quality does not seem to be present in clear experiences.
Thus, a question arises as to whether the interoceptive theory has resources to
accommodate this phenomenal disunity between blurred and clear experiences.
Second, the motivational aspect that was used in justifying the interoceptive
character of visual blur is more apparent in cases of global blur than depth blur. In
consequence, one may doubt whether the interoceptive theory of blurred vision is
able to account for depth blur. Third, a plausible theory of blurred vision should not
only postulate that there is some interoceptive content of visual states but should
also provide some sensible idea concerning what this content is; i.e., what is
presented about visual system in clear and blurred experiences. Fourth, while visual
blur is not attributed to the external environment, it seems to have a certain spatial
aspect (see Mehta 2013). In particular, in globally blurred experiences all objects
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look blurry, but in others that involve depth but not global blur, only distal (or only
proximal) objects are seen in a blurry way. Hence, one may ask whether the
interoceptive theory can plausibly explain these spatial differences.
To answer these questions, let us as a starting point consider a particular class of
interoceptive experiences: proprioceptive experiences presenting the position of
bodily parts. It is commonly claimed that usually proprioceptive experiences are
only peripherally present in our consciousness unless something attracts attention
toward a bodily part (e.g., Elder 2013; Hochstetter 2016; Lana 2017). For instance,
in a normal situation the phenomenology of having a leg bend in a particular way
seems to be less phenomenally salient than in cases of painful or tactile experiences.
Similarly, when conducting common movements, we do not have a salient
phenomenology of specific positions of bodily parts at subsequent moments (see
Marcel 2003). Furthermore, such peripheral proprioceptive experiences are not
usually associated with any strong motivational force. However, the phenomenal
status of proprioceptive experiences changes when something goes wrong. For
instance, when one fails to conduct an action, like grabbing an item, or when one’s
bodily position is uncomfortable (Kinsbourne 1995). In such cases, proprioceptive
experiences become more salient and their motivational aspect increases. Some-
times, when proprioceptive processing is severely disturbed by neurological
damage, a person may have a feeling of ‘disembodiment’ or experience a body part
as ‘alien,’ which is severely disturbing and occupies a central place in consciousness
(Ford and Smith 2006). The example of proprioceptive experiences shows that there
are interoceptive experiences that have two important characteristics: (a) in normal
cases they are not phenomenally salient and are not associated with strong
motivational aspect, but (b) their saliency and motivational aspect are likely to be
stronger when an experience presents some form of disorder.
Having the above features of certain interoceptive experiences in mind, let us
investigate in a more detailed way the phenomenon of depth blur. In fact, the
majority of visual experiences we intuitively categorize as ‘clear’ involve some
form of depth blur, as depending on how our eyes are focused, not all objects are
perceived with the same acuity. In other words, usual visual experiences contain
some combination of phenomenal clearness and phenomenal blurriness. More
precisely, the phenomenal combinations of clearness and depth blur occurring in
ordinary experience are determined by two factors.
To demonstrate it, let’s consider a visual scene composed of a proximally
positioned apple and a distally positioned pear. The first factor is eye focus: when
one’s eyes are focused on the apple, the pear looks blurry, and conversely, when
one’s eyes are focused on the pear, the apple looks blurry. Without any changes in
the composition of the visual scene, phenomenal combinations of depth blur and
clearness may be modified by differences in eye focus that lead to distinct
distributions of acuity. The second factor concerns modifications of the visual scene
without changing the eye focus. For instance, if one’s eyes are focused on the
proximal apple, the distal pear looks blurry, but there is no phenomenally salient
visual blur in empty space around the pear. However, if without changing the eye
focus another object, perhaps an orange, is positioned next to the pear, it will be
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saliently blurred. In consequence, the overall combination of phenomenal clearness
and depth blur would change without any modification of eye focus.
Relying on the above considerations, I propose that the interoceptive content
characterizes a state of the visual system: a distribution of visual acuity in relation to
eye focus. More precisely, as each eye focus is associated with a distribution of
visual acuity, the interoceptive content of visual experiences can be described as a
triple:\ acuity distribution Dx, eye focus Fx, matching relation R[ . The relational
element R specifies whether the distribution of acuity matches the eye focus. For
instance, if one’s eyes are focused on a proximal object and distal objects are
blurred, then the distribution of acuity matches eye focus. However, if one’s eyes
are focused on a proximal object but all objects, both distal and proximal, are
blurred, then matching does not occur. Later, I refer to this element in order to
distinguish depth blur from global blur. The distribution of acuity specifies what
acuity the visual system has for each perceived entity, like an object, an object’s
part, or an empty place, and can be modeled as a conjunction: visual system has
acuity Ax for entity Ey and … and visual system has acuity An for entity Em, where
Ax and An represent various levels of acuity and Ey and Em represent perceived
entities.
The phenomenal combinations of clearness and depth blur supervene on the
proposed interoceptive content. For illustration, let us consider the earlier example
in which one changes eye focus from a proximal apple to a distal pear. The resulting
phenomenal change in combination of clearness and depth blur is determined by a
change in interoceptive visual content. The eye focus and the distribution of acuity
changes, and while earlier interoceptive content contained elements such as visual
system has high acuity for apple-entity, visual system has low acuity for pear-entity,
now it contains the following elements: visual system has low acuity for apple-
entity, visual system has high acuity for pear-entity. Similarly, when a distal orange
is added next to a distal pear, while one’s eyes are constantly focused on a proximal
apple, the occurring phenomenal change in combination of clearness and depth blur
is also associated with a change in the interoceptive content. A new element of
content appears, visual system has low acuity for orange-entity, which replaces an
earlier element specifying that the visual system has equally low acuity for some
empty place (now occupied by an orange). Furthermore, changes in interoceptive
content have consequences for exteroceptive content, as the transition from higher
to lower acuity is associated with a loss of exteroceptive content.
Phenomenal combinations of clearness and depth blur are normal occurrences
which depend in an important way on the manner in which eyes are focused. In
consequence, similar to the case of normal proprioceptive experiences, they are not
particularly salient and are not associated with a strong motivational force.
However, there is a special type of blurred experiences in which acuity is lowered
independently from the eye focus: occurrences of global blur. In usual experiences
involving depth blur, the distribution of acuity changes together with eye focus; for
instance, the interoceptive content may be at first\D1, F1, R[ and then\D2, F2,
R[ , where matching relation R represents that in both cases acuity distribution
matches eye focus. On the other hand, when global blur occurs, interoceptive
content is such that despite changes in eye focus, the distribution of acuity remains
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the same or is lowered in a way that is unexpected, for example content\D1, F1,
R[ changes to\D1, F2, * R[ , where matching relation * R represents that
there is no matching between eye focus and distribution of acuity. A loss of acuity
occurring independently from changes in eye focus signals a disorder in the visual
system’s function, and so global blur is phenomenally salient and likely to motivate
actions directed toward the eyes.
The above considerations allow me to address the four questions asked earlier.
First, the phenomenal features associated with interoceptive content are more salient
in cases of global blur than in case of combinations of clearness and depth blur
because the phenomenology of global blur is characteristic of disorders of the visual
system. Second, for the same reasons, globally blurred experiences typically have a
stronger motivational component. Third, in both cases of combinations of clearness
with depth blur and of global blur, the interoceptive content is of the same type. All
of these phenomena interoceptively present acuity of vision in relation to eye focus,
where global blur is associated with a special situation in which acuity is lowered
independently of eye focus. Fourth, the specification of interoceptive content allows
explanation of why blurred experiences may differ in spatial characteristics of visual
blur: it is so because interoceptive content characterizes visual acuity in relation to
eye focus, and different ways of focusing one’s eyes determines whether distal or
proximal objects are perceived as blurry.
Furthermore, by specifying the interoceptive content of blurred experiences, the
phenomenon of blurred vision can be distinguished from that of peripheral vision.
The blurriness-related phenomenology interoceptively presents the acuity of vision
in relation to eye focus and is associated with some loss of exteroceptive content.
Peripheral vision also plausibly has some interoceptive content and involves loss of
exteroceptive content. However, it is unlikely that the peripheral interoceptive
content concerns changes in acuity resulting from eye focus, as a change in focus
has little effect on how peripheral information is processed. While proper
investigation of this would require another paper, it is probable that the specific
phenomenology of peripheral vision interoceptively presents that the stimuli is
processed in a less detailed way due to eyes’ position rather than focus.
Earlier, I have noted that the interoceptive theory is consistent both with the
representationalist thesis and certain strong readings of the transparency thesis.
Furthermore, it is also unthreatened by problems which are typical for theories of
blurred vision described in Sect. 2. First, the interoceptive solution preserves the
intuition that visual blur is not attributed to external entities, as blur-related changes
regarding exteroceptive content consist only of loss of content and not the
attribution of any additional property. Second, according to interoceptive theory
there is no need to postulate that the content of blurred experiences is in some way
internally inconsistent, or that there is no phenomenal difference between blurred
experiences and clear experiences presenting fuzzy items. Finally, the proposed





I have proposed a new theory of blurred vision according to which visual
experiences have two types of content: exteroceptive content, characterizing
external entities, and interoceptive content, characterizing the state of the visual
system. More specifically, blurriness-related phenomenology interoceptively pre-
sents acuity of vision in relation to eye focus. When vision becomes globally
blurred, some exteroceptive content is lost and the visual system is presented as
having lowered acuity independent of how one’s eyes are focused. This is
experienced as an abnormal state and is often connected with motivational force. On
the other hand, normal experiences involve some phenomenal combination of
clearness and depth blur that is largely determined by eye focus. Such experiences
are not connected with strong motivational force but still possess an interoceptive
aspect presenting a distribution of visual acuity in relation to eye focus. The
proposed theory is consistent with the representationalist thesis that phenomenal
character supervenes on representational content and with the strong transparency
thesis formulated in terms of mind-independentness. Furthermore, the interoceptive
approach is free of the controversial assumptions adopted by other theories of
blurred vision and is able to explain the epistemic and motivational role of visual
blur.
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